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Contracting in expeditionary operations is not new. 
What is new is the scope and magnitude of the roles 
that contracting and contractors play in today’s mili-
tary operations. Lack of planning and sound contract 
integration at the strategic level leads to inefficiencies, 
ineffectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud. Annex 
W, Operational Contract Support Plan, is the overall 
operations plan for Geographic Combatant Commands 
and the Services within the Adaptive Planning and 
Execution System framework. The authors propose an 
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) model for opera-
tional contract support and its integration into Annex W 
and existing war planning systems by congressionally 
mandating, authorizing, and funding IPE positions within 
Service structures. The IPE would be vested with the 
authority to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W.
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Military organizations throughout the world are increasingly called 
to perform missions and create outcomes that are reliant on contractor 
support. In fact, contractors perform myriad functions in modern, often 
complex, military operations. Additionally, the military services are 
subject to ever increasing scrutiny and accountability to become better 
stewards of scarce resources, to eliminate potential waste, and to reduce 
abuse of taxpayer money due to poor management, operational redun-
dancy and duplication of effort, and outright corruption.
Military Stands to Gain from  
Newest Initiatives in Doctrine
Because of an increased reliance on contractors and recent demands 
for improved accountability and performance, the authors contend 
that international military organizations will benefit by incorporating 
Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO), and strategic and integra-
tive planning for contingency and expeditionary operations. The PZCO 
concept has gained high-level attention as it is now embedded in Joint 
Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2011), and in JP 4-10, Operational Contract 
Support (OCS) (CJCS, 2008), and currently under revision. Additionally, 
PZCO protocols were proposed and published in 2010, and the concept 
has gained popularity among military leaders seeking to improve mili-
tary capability while following sound business practices (Yoder, 2010). 
PZCO, in essence and conceptually, is somewhat already embedded in 
recent doctrine, specifically within JP 5-0 and JP 4-10. However, it is 
not being fully implemented. This article addresses shortfalls in imple-
mentation, conceptually and pragmatically. Additionally, the authors 
utilize two analytical frameworks—the Three-Tier Model (TTM) and 
three pillars for integrative success—to identify shortfalls and recom-
mendations for improvements.
The PZCO concept for strategic leaders and planners is presented, 
including the scope and magnitude of current and future contractor 
support, the need for integration and coordination amongst stakehold-
ers, key PZCO model constructs, and alignment with key aspects of the 
Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX), which must include 
contracting. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are provided for 
forward-thinking leaders and planners.
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The Scope and Magnitude of Contractor  
Support in Expeditionary Operations
Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon. 
What is new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contrac-
tors play in today’s military operations. For example, in March 2011 the 
Congressional Research Service reported that in the Central Command 
Area of Responsibility, the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel 
supporting operations was .81:1 (Schwartz & Swain, 2011). Even if global 
operating tempos decline, many experts believe that reliance on contrac-
tor personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in relation to 
the number of uniformed personnel. The New York Times reported in 
February 2012 that 113,491 contractor personnel were in Afghanistan 
compared to 90,000 U.S. soldiers (Nordland, 2012). It should be noted 
that not all contractors in theater were directly supporting Department 
of Defense (DoD) operations in that, for example, the United States 
Agency for International Development and many private volunteer 
organizations and nongovernmental organizations utilize contractors 
and may be included in The New York Times-reported tally.
Particularly noteworthy is the scope and variety of contracted func-
tions. These functions include base operations support, weapon systems 
support, security services, and a host of others.
High Reliance on Contracted Support  
Has Created Challenges
Based on continued public and political pressure to keep organic 
uniform force structures low, the continued reliance on contract sup-
port for military operations is not likely to wane. Nevertheless, this high 
reliance on contractor support has also created challenges for military 
planners, operators, contracting units, and even for the contractors 
themselves. Challenges have manifested in command and control, in 
integration into Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) battle and 
Based on continued public and political pressure 
to keep organic uniform force structures low, the 
continued reliance on contract support for military 
operations is not likely to wane.
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operational schema, and in the need for advanced planning, phasing, 
and timing of contracting events to synchronize with and complement 
operations plans (OPLAN). Additionally, planners must consider com-
munications and movement plans, weapons control, compliance with 
Host Nation and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), contract manage-
ment and oversight, indemnity and insurance of government-contracted 
personnel, prevention of human trafficking, third-country national labor 
protections, issuing and maintaining security clearances, and lawsuits 
under the Defense Base Act, to name only a few. Many of the challenges 
stem from a shift in organic uniformed-force capability to a contracted 
capability—from “doing” to “managing.” So what can military leaders 
and planners do to effectively and efficiently manage all of these aspects 
of contracted support? The incorporation of PZCO into the design and 
construct of military planning will address many of the challenges 
identified previously.
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Credentialed Contract Planners Integrated with 
Operations Planners and Stakeholders
The TTM, a credential-based personnel hierarchy for contracting 
officers and planning staff, was published to address the challenges 
inherent in contracting in complex military operations (Yoder, 2004). 
It optimizes the integrative planning, coordination, and execution 
required for contingency and expeditionary operations at the tacti-
cal, operational, and strategic levels of the organization. The model is 
based on two primary premises. First, mission optimization occurs only 
with well-credentialed contracting planners and executors. Second, 
optimized stakeholder integration, including, for example, operational 
commanders, supporting units, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), 
and private voluntary organizations (PVO), can only be accomplished by 
utilizing well-credentialed participants in the planning and execution 
phases (Yoder, 2011).
Phase Zero Contracting Operations—The Three-Tier Model
The TTM has specific personnel credentials in three primary tiers: 
(a) Tier One—Training and education; (b) Tier Two—Certification 
(such as Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act [DAWIA] 
contracting levels, security clearance requirements, etc.); and (c) Tier 
Three—Experience.
The three tiers are described in the following paragraphs.
In Tier One, the ordering officer serves at the lowest level. This con-
tracting level has several identifying attributes. Tier One personnel 
reside within the tactical level of the military hierarchy and are the most 
prevalent contracting personnel within most formal military and civilian 
organizations. The Tier One personnel are junior civilians and military 
staff. They operate at the tactical and unit levels, and perform no integra-
tive planning at the operational and strategic levels. Tier One personnel 
place basic orders and conduct simple transactions. In the broadest terms, 
little stakeholder integration is being initiated or managed at this level. 
However, this lowest level is absolutely essential because it represents 
where a majority of “in-the-field” contracting actions are conducted. Tier 
One is the tactical level of the enterprise. Particular importance at Tier 
One is placed on standardized training—emphasizing protocols, ethical 
conduct, management, control, and oversight.
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In the middle of the hierarchy is Tier Two, which leverages the 
capabilities of contracting officers who serve at the operational level. 
The Tier Two personnel require enhanced credentials. These personnel 
conduct complex contracting transactions and leverage local economy 
assets. They may perform all functions associated with Tier One person-
nel, but with increased credentials, scope, and responsibilities. The TTM 
calls for Tier Two personnel to be mid-level civilians, mid-grade officers, 
or credentialed senior enlisted. They can be integrated into planning and 
local operations, performing some integrative planning at the tactical 
and operational levels; and they can perform some liaison functions 
with broader stakeholders. Their main mission is to optimize local 
operations in harmony with strategic guidance. They will also prepare 
Annex W, Operational Contract Support Plan, when serving on a Joint 
Task Force staff during crisis action planning. Since Tier Two person-
nel serve at the operational level of the organization, expertise in the 
protocols, ethical conduct, management, control and oversight, conduct 
of complex negotiations, broad business acumen in complex military 
contracting, and phase I Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I) 
is required. Currently, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense 
Acquisition University offer CON 234–Contingency Contracting and 
CON 334–Advanced Contingency Contracting courses to standardize 
education in the contingency contracting business field.
An IPE must be strategically positioned within 
the organization to achieve the highest levels of 
integrative planning.
The highest and most crucial tier in the TTM is Tier Three, the flag 
officer or senior civilian position designated as the integrated planner 
and executor (IPE). The Tier Three personnel are at the strategic level 
of military and civilian organizations. Tier Three calls for the high-
est credentials including, but not be limited to, JPME I & II, DAWIA 
Contracting Level III certification and warrant (or international equiva-
lent), a graduate degree or higher, a Top Secret security clearance, and 
experience in operations and contracting gained through experiential 
tours or assignments (Yoder, 2010). Figure 1 highlights the key aspects 
of the IPE position (Yoder, 2011).
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An IPE must be strategically positioned within the organization to 
achieve the highest levels of integrative planning. The IPE’s primary 
mission is creating and validating a comprehensive Annex W to comple-
ment all elements of the OPLAN. Ideally, the IPE position should be 
placed within the Joint Staff, at GCC, and at the highest operational and 
planning staffs within each Service branch.
The IPE will create and validate Annex W in all key GCC OPLAN 
and concept plan (CONPLAN) elements. (Specific content elements of 
Annex W are presented later in this article.) Because of the complexity 
and magnitude of the tasks involved in creating and validating com-
prehensive plans, the IPE requires a supporting staff and subordinate 
expertise in key strategic and analytical areas, such as OPLAN analysis, 
logistics assessments, contracting, and similar professional disciplines.
Of note, most organizations do not have a dedicated contracting IPE 
(by any moniker) within their organizational structure. Traditionally, 
the joint logistics (J-4) organizations have embedded contracting offi-
cers. However, the contracting positions within J-4, or within traditional 
logistics organizations, have been utilized as adjunct positions to the 
FIGURE 1. THREE-TIER MODEL: TIER THREE, INTEGRATED 
PLANNER AND EXECUTOR
Source. (Yoder, 2010)
Note. CSIP = Contract Support Integration Plan
I.P.E.
• Highest level of planning and integration
• Strategic Level (Joint Staff, GCC, etc.)
• Works with Joint and Combined Logistics, Planning, and Ops
• Links operation strategy to contract integration in OPLANs
• High-level civilians and senior-grade officers
• Liaison functions with broader stakeholders — NGO and PVO
• Designs and exercises contracting support plans
• Comprehensive analysis to create contract schema
• Develops Annex W (CSIP)




— control and oversight
— most experienced
— highest education
— joint and multidisciplinary experience
This level was and is 
virtually nonexistent at the 
strategic level!
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broader logistics functional planning. Additionally, because of the rela-
tively low military rank and lack of seniority, contracting personnel 
on J-4 staffs often lack both the credentials and the clout to effectively 
execute the requirements proposed for the IPE.
Despite the DoD Components and military services lacking an IPE 
at the strategic level, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 
(NDAA, 2008) made significant impact at addressing credentialed per-
sonnel shortfalls at the strategic level. The NDAA 2008 authorized and 
established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), 
directed by a military one-star flag officer, positioned within the Defense 
Logistics Agency. JCASO has a staff of 49 personnel expressly to provide 
IPE strategic-level assistance and contract support to GCCs. These 
JCASO specialists work with GCC planning staffs to incorporate essen-
tial contracting plans at the GCC. According to Navy Rear Admiral Ron 
J. MacLaren, director of JCASO, each GCC is allocated two special-
ists from JCASO to assist in the development and exercise of each key 
OPLAN’s Annex W (MacLaren, 2012).
Will the DoD Components and the military services embrace the 
TTM, particularly the IPE function established by NDAA 2008 as the 
JCASO? Currently, JCASO has not been empowered with authority to 
compel GCC or the DoD Components and military services to utilize 
their OCS development functions. Rather, it represents an advisory group 
Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO)
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that must “sell” its capabilities to improve mission support through inte-
grative planning (MacLaren, 2012). Only time and sound metric analysis 
will prove whether or not the JCASO is effective at creating the needed 
Annex W OCS plans mandated and needed for key GCC OPLANs.
What specifically will the IPE position accomplish, and what will it 
achieve? If the warfighters are to embrace OCS, they must understand 
what essential functions the IPE achieves, and how those functions will 
yield benefits.
Phase Zero—Planning, Exercising, and Rehearsal
Phase Zero, generally known in GCC planning arenas as the shaping 
phase, is adopted by the OCS contracting community as the planning 
and exercising phase. Traditional military jargon defines Phase Zero 
as “shaping.” Phase Zero contracting in the integrative strategic plan-
ning arena is the advance planning, exercising, and rehearsal of robust 
contracting support plans designed to complement the GCC’s deliberate 
and contingency planning process. Realistically, the contracting com-
munity and the warfighter have the same vision for Phase Zero—get the 
plans in place, then rehearse, validate, and update them to reflect current 
realities. In essence, Phase Zero contract planning and the creation of 
OPLAN Annex W became mandatory under NDAA 2008 (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). The authorization and supporting 
guidance under JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008), requires all GCCs to create Annex 
W for OPLANs, representing the embodiment of Phase Zero integrative 
planning. However, despite the mandate, what is particularly disconcert-
ing is that the GAO recently determined that only four out of 39 OPLANs 
requiring comprehensive Annex W integration plans actually had them 
(GAO, 2011). The low rate of Annex W integration may be a result of 
the challenges in assimilation and normalization of new doctrine and 
processes that DoD initially approved in 2008. MacLaren indicates that 
significant work is ahead to get all the GCC OPLAN Annex W support 
plans in place and exercised (MacLaren, 2012). The authors contend 
that current operational tempos, along with constrained budgets, may 
preclude achieving fully integrated exercises and rehearsals for all 
OPLANs, as these rehearsals can carry a huge price tag. However, failure 
to exercise and rehearse, based on recent and well-documented problems 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, results in costs that far outweigh the up-front 
costs to fully vet Annex W plans. Deliberate planning and contingency 
planning are different—the first is not necessarily time-sensitive, but 
the second may be very time-sensitive and is often constrained. While 
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JCASO has assigned two specialists at each GCC to assist in creating 
and exercising each Annex W, ultimately, the DoD Component and mili-
tary services’ contract warrant holders will be responsible for providing 
actual contract support, and must be included in the planning, exercise, 
rehearsal, and execution of the OPLAN. For the most critical OPLANs, 
sound strategy requires the exercise and rehearsal of each Annex W with 
the personnel that will ultimately be called into action.
Ideally, each OPLAN and CONPLAN will have an Annex W, fully 
drafted, exercised, rehearsed, analyzed, and revised. The doctrinal 
framework published in JP 5-0, along with JP 4-10, is key for the design 
and integration of contracting into OPLANs. The authors note that JP 
5-0 does not currently require an Annex W—only JP 4-10 requires it. The 
objective is to embed and synchronize the OCS plan with all elements 
of the OPLAN to meet the commander’s intent. Properly constructed 
Annex W plans must include elements such as, but not limited to, per-
sonnel/organizational structures and authorities; business protocols, 
including special statutory and regulatory provisions under declared 
contingencies; scheme of operations; synchronization with the battle 
plan; oversight; management and auditing; personnel regulations and 
provisions; spend analysis integration; synchronization with broader 
strategic objectives; and metrics for assessment of the efficiencies and 
effectiveness of embedded plans and actions (Yoder, 2011).
To ensure the efficacy of the integrated Annex W plan, the IPE 
must act as a strategic liaison with key stakeholders. Analytical assess-
ments of the Annex W plan may utilize strength, weakness, opportunity, 
threat (SWOT) and capability gap analysis techniques. The SWOT 
method allows the IPE to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses/limita-
tions, opportunities, and threats; and, ultimately, the potential efficacy 
of the OPLAN’s integrated contracting plan. The capability gap analysis 
determines the support and provisioning gaps in the OPLAN that may 
be addressed through contracted support.
Contracting Phases—Complementing Warfighter Strategy
Contingency contracting planning must complement and seam-
lessly integrate with the DoD and Combatant Command APEX planning 
process. On the surface, the two processes appear distinctly different, 
with phasing graphics exhibiting dissimilar phasing models and activ-
ity descriptions within each phase. Examination of each model reveals 
Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO)
360Defense ARJ, October 2013, Vol. 20 No. 3 : 349–372
that the two processes are complementary, but care must be taken to 
ensure that contracting phasing supports and is parallel with opera-
tional planning.
The DoD deliberate planning process generally includes six phases, 
although the number and types of phases are contingent upon the char-
acteristics of the joint operation. For instance, a combat operation will 
be phased differently than a humanitarian relief operation. JP 5-0 
describes the notional phasing construct (Figure 2) as follows: Phase 0 
(Shape) includes normal and routine military activities as well as secu-
rity cooperation activities that are contained within the theater 
campaign plan (TCP). The TCP includes steady state operations and 
activities intended to promote international legitimacy and cooperation 
with friends and allies, while dissuading adversaries. Phase I (Deter) 
includes those activities that demonstrate “joint force capabilities and 
resolve” in response to an adversary’s undesirable actions. Actions 
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include preparation for deployment, deployment, and shows of force 
designed to influence an adversary’s decision-making process. Phase II 
(Seize Initiative) begins the “application of appropriate joint force capa-
bilities” to “delay, impede, or halt an adversary’s initial aggression.” This 
phase sets the conditions for the successful implementation of the Phase 
III (Dominate) phase. Phase III includes actions designed to “break the 
enemy’s will . . . or, in noncombat operations, to control the operational 
environment.” Phase IV (Stabilize) is “required when there is no fully 
functional legitimate civil governing authority,” and joint forces must 
perform limited local governance and other activities to allow for a res-
toration of stability and a return to normalcy. This phase may require 
joint force cooperation and coordination with intergovernmental orga-
nizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other civilian agencies. 
Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) includes the provision of “joint force 
support to legitimate civil governance” in theater as well as assistance 
with the provision of essential services to local populations. It usually 
includes redeployment operations, especially of combat forces, as well 
as the planning for transition back to Phase 0 or steady-state operations. 
Figure 3 illustrates the notional operation plan phases (CJCS, 2011, pp. 
III-41–III-44).
FIGURE 3. THREE-TIER MODEL: TIER THREE, INTEGRATED  
PLANNER AND EXECUTOR 
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FIGURE 4. CONTRACTING PHASE ZERO: PLAN, EXERCISE, REHEARSE, AND SYNCHRONIZE
Note. BPA = Blanket Purchase Agreement; COCO = Chief of Contracting Office; DO = Delivery Order; FOO = Field Ordering Officer; HCA = Head of Contracting Activity; JRSOI = Joint Reception, 
Staging and Onward Integration; PO = Purchase Order; RFP = Request for Proposal; SCO = Senior Contracting Official; SF-44 = Standard Form 44; TO = Task Order. 
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four
Mobilization and Initial
Deployment
Buildup Sustainment Termination and
Redeployment
Declared Contingency
Set up initial contracting operations
Transfer of Authority
Reduce and transfer contracting
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Since NDAA 2008, contracting has utilized five support phases. 
Phase Zero (Figure 4) is the planning, exercise, and rehearsal phase. 
During this phase, contingency contracting planners work with com-
batant command staffs in the deliberate planning process to develop 
the Annex W for each campaign and operations plan. Exercising and 
rehearsing these plans is imperative to ensure they meet the warfighter’s 
expectations and correspond with Phase 0 of the deliberate planning 
process. Phase I is deployment, during which initial contracting opera-
tions and relationships are established, especially to provide basic life 
support requirements for arriving personnel. It corresponds roughly 
with the first half of the warfighter’s Phase I (Deter). The contracting 
Phase II is joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. 
This phase includes the arrival of the main body of deploying forces 
and their equipment. It requires the establishment of more robust con-
tracting initiatives, including expanded life support requirements and 
temporary construction to support the deployed force and corresponds 
with the warfighter’s Phase I (Deter), as well as elements of Phase II 
(Seize Initiative). Phase III (Sustainment) provides contracting support 
from the completion of the build-up phase until the beginning of the 
redeployment of the force. It also includes stability and reconstruction. 
This contingency contracting phase corresponds with the warfighter’s 
Phase II (Seize Initiative), Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize), 
and portions of Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). The contracting Phase 
IV is termination and redeployment, and includes activities that support 
the “pressure and urgency to send the deployed forces home.” It also 
includes close-out of existing contracts as well as establishing contracts 
for follow-on forces, such as United Nations peacekeepers (Defense 
Procurement, 2012, pp. 111–121).
DoD Directive (DoDD) 3020.49 mandates the coordination and 
synchronization of contracting with broader warfighter OPLANs (DoD, 
2009). As Figure 4 illustrates, contracting phasing does not correspond 
exactly with the warfighter’s phasing plan. This lack of correspondence 
can lead to misunderstanding, lack of communication within the plan-
ning staff, and a failure of coordination and synchronization. The authors 
strongly suggest that contracting personnel revise the phasing plan to 
more closely correspond with the JP 5.0 phasing construct.
OPEN TO SEE FIGURE
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Phase Zero and Mandatory Pillars for Strategic 
Contracting Integration
As defined previously, Phase Zero is the planning, exercising, and 
rehearsal phase of military operations—properly establishing and vet-
ting the contracting plan prior to an actual event or crisis. To function 
effectively within the established and existing military deliberate and 
contingency planning framework, the IPE and associated functions 
must be designed within three main pillars: personnel, platforms, and 
protocols (Figure 5). Failure to integrate contracting with all of the three 
primary pillars will result in suboptimization or outright contract sup-
port and/or mission failure (Yoder, 2010).
The first pillar, personnel, should be addressed by implementing 
the TTM and particularly the IPE. The second pillar, platforms, is 
addressed by integrating contracting throughout all phases of military 
operations and into the existing warfighters’ platform for planning and 
execution—the APEX. Additionally, it must be embedded with other 
FIGURE 5. MANDATORY PILLARS FOR INTEGRATIVE SUCCESS
Note. APEX = Adaptive Planning & Execution System; GCC = Global Combatant 
Commander; IPE = Integrated Planner and Executor; JCASO = Joint Contingency 
Acquisition Support Office; PD2 = Procurement Defense Desktop; SPS = Standard 
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APEX-complementary platforms, such as the Time Phased Force and 
Deployment Data (TPFDD) system. The third pillar, protocols, repre-
sents the existing or desirable set of rules and procedures, including 
sound business, planning, and military doctrine that govern the planning 
and execution of the contracting plan within the broader OPLAN. Figure 
5 highlights the three pillars and associated elements.
Protocols include, but are not limited to, the strategic planning 
guidance established by the GCC; strategic purchasing guidance and 
mandates; JP 4-10, JP 5-0, JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint 
Operations (CJCS, 2000), and other doctrinal publications; and associ-
ated mandates for constructing and implementing Annex W for each 
unique OPLAN. Additionally, acquisition- and contracting-specific laws, 
regulations, and guidance must be utilized including, but not limited 
to, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (2012) and the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (Defense Procurement, 2013), as 
well as any specific military service acquisition regulations.
Annex W must include all of the key elements for 
mission success and address the three mandatory 
pillars for integrative success: personnel, 
platforms, and protocols.
The Integrated Planner and Executor within Strategic 
Planning, APEX Products, and Annex W
Joint strategic planning products include, but are not limited to, GCC 
estimates, base plans, OPLANs, CONPLANs, warning orders, planning 
orders, alert orders, operation orders (OPORD), execute orders, fragmen-
tary orders, and deployment orders, along with all annexes including the 
newly mandated Annex W. These products are alien to most contracting 
and acquisition professionals because, traditionally, contracting and 
acquisition personnel have not played a key role in the production or 
management of these critical documents. The GAO recently conducted 
an audit of 39 OPLANs requiring an integrated Annex W, and found that 
only four operational contracting plans had been produced (GAO, 2011).
Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO)
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FIGURE 6.  MINIMUM ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN AN INTEGRATED ANNEX W
1. Mission statement—from the OPLAN or OPORD
2. Primary and secondary customers
3. Anticipated requirements (in relative time-phase)
4. Forces deploying in sequence and duration
5. Operational locations
6. Lead service
7. Organization structure (Head of Contracting Activity, Joint Acquisition 
Review Board, etc.)
8. Supported and supporting relationships
9. Command and control relationships
10. Procedures for appointing, training, and employing field ordering officers, 
contacting officer representatives, disbursing agents, and government 
purchase card holders
11. Procedures for defining, validating, processing, and satisfying customer 
requirements
12. Procedures for budgeting receipt of supplies/services and payments to 
vendors
13. Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment
14. Supplies and services anticipated locally, local customs, laws, taxes, SOFAs, 
host nation support, Acquisition Cross-Service Agreements, vendor base, etc.
15. Infrastructure, office location, security measures, kits, etc.
16. Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor 
personnel
17. Standards of support—processing times, turn-around-time, Procurement 
Acquisition Lead Time, and reporting
18. Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions, special authorities,  
and programs
19. Relief in place/transfer of authority
20. Contractor restrictions (movement, basing, etc., time-phase specific)
21. Guidance on transferring Logistics Civil Augmentation Program support to 
theater support contracts by function and/or phase of the operation
22. Special authorities and programs (Commanders’ Emergency Response 
Program–Counterinsurgency)
23. Postcontract  award actions (management, closeout, de-obligation, etc.)
24. Contractor support, civil augmentation programs
25. Mandated solicitation and contract provisions
26. Human trafficking mandates, indemnity, and Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act provisions
Source: (Yoder, 2010)
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Clearly, given the defined content of Annex W, the contracting at the 
strategic IPE level must be included in all phases of planning and in the 
production of key APEX products. Annex W must include all of the key 
elements for mission success and address the three mandatory pillars for 
integrative success: personnel, platforms, and protocols. The integrated 
Annex W must include, at a minimum, those elements deemed essential 
for mission accomplishment, while addressing cost and affordability 
within the overall OPLAN. The contents include, but are not limited to, 
as indicated in Yoder (2010), the 26 elements shown in Figure 6.
Without a comprehensive planning capability, most missions will be 
negatively affected. Clearly, the IPE, properly positioned within the plan-
ning community, can better create and assess the Annex W capabilities 
within the three main pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—to 
allow for future success.
Conclusions
To date, contracting has not been fully integrated into military 
planning and execution. Some significant strides have been made to 
better assimilate contracting at the strategic level, including Dr. Jacques 
Gansler’s (2007) report, Urgent Reform Required, and the recently pub-
lished doctrine contained in JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008). However, despite the 
push toward better integration, including the newly formed JCASO, the 
DoD still lacks a manifest comprehensive planning and executing capa-
bility, as evidenced most recently in the final report of the Commission 
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011).
The lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strate-
gic level leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many 
cases, outright fraud of the executing participants as highlighted in 
the 2011 report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
The functions of the IPE and mandates for OCS (CJCS, 2008), includ-
ing generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W, are so massive that the 
Services have recently contracted out, or outsourced, some of the require-
ment (Yoder, 2011). However, outsourcing this critical function may only 
make matters worse, in that key decisions will be left in the purview of 
nongovernment personnel, including decisions of further contracting, 
along with other possible conflicts of interest and potential for corruption.
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The authors contend that the best means to accomplish integration 
into existing war planning systems is by congressionally mandating, 
authorizing, and funding (via appropriation) the IPE positions at the 
flag and senior executive service levels within Service structures. In the 
short term, the authors recommend that JCASO have more status and 
capability within GCC and Service staffs, particularly in assisting the 
GCC staff to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W within the APEX 
framework. This will require greater engagement capability than cur-
rently exists. In the long-term, the authors recommend Congressional 
approval and funding of IPE positions organically within the GCC staff, 
providing them with direct authority for the development, review, and 
employment of Annex W. This greater presence and authority at the IPE 
level within the GCC staff represents the level of bona fide commitment 
to solve a long-standing problem that, without correction, will continue 
to fester and plague Service chiefs, military commanders, Congress, and 
taxpayers. Additionally, fully aligning and integrating the contracting 
community’s processes with the joint community planning system is 
imperative. Failure to do so may result in lack of communication, lack 
of synchronization of support plans, and marginalization of contracting 
personnel within the GCC planning staff. Implementing PZCO planning 
through sound public policy, congressional authorization and funding, 
and the Services’ commitment to fully integrate contracting within 
the three pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—is the proactive 
move toward success.
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